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BLD-192        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1340 
 ___________ 
 
 RICHARD E. BOYD,  
   Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania  
 (D.C. Civil No. 2:10-cv-01492) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Gary L. Lancaster  
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 19, 2011 
 
 Before:  SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  June 3, 2011) 
 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Richard Boyd, a Pennsylvania state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the 
District Court’s order dismissing his complaint, as well as from the court’s subsequent 
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order denying his motion for reconsideration.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
summarily affirm. 
I. 
 Boyd is currently serving a 12- to 26-year prison sentence in connection with his 
2000 conviction in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, Pennsylvania, for 
several sex-related crimes.  In November 2010, Boyd commenced this action against the 
Governor of Pennsylvania by filing a complaint in the District Court.  The complaint, 
which sought damages and Boyd’s release from custody, claimed that Boyd was being 
imprisoned unlawfully because his speedy trial rights had been violated in the 
aforementioned criminal proceeding. 
 The District Court referred the complaint to a Magistrate Judge, who issued a 
report recommending that the court dismiss the complaint without leave to amend for 
failure to state a claim.  In doing so, the Magistrate Judge concluded that a habeas corpus 
petition, not a complaint, was the proper vehicle for challenging the legality of Boyd’s 
confinement.  The Magistrate Judge further concluded that Boyd’s claim for damages 
failed because Boyd had not established that his convictions had been invalidated.  On 
December 27, 2010, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and 
dismissed Boyd’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b) for 
failure to state a claim.  Boyd subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, which the 
District Court denied on January 27, 2010.  This appeal followed.  
II. 
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 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of Boyd’s complaint, see 
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000), and review the court’s denial of his 
motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion.  See Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-
Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999).     
 For substantially the reasons set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s report, we agree 
with the District Court’s decision to dismiss Boyd’s complaint without leave to amend 
for failure to state a claim.1
                                                 
1 We note that Boyd has previously (and unsuccessfully) challenged these 
convictions in a habeas proceeding.  As a result, even if the District Court had 
construed the instant complaint as another habeas petition, the petition would have 
been subject to dismissal as an unauthorized second or successive habeas petition.  
See Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 157 (2007) (per curiam).    
  Furthermore, we conclude that the District Court did not err 
in denying Boyd’s motion for reconsideration.  Because this appeal does not present a 
substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s December 27, 2010 
and January 27, 2011 orders.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.  Boyd’s motion 
challenging the Clerk’s April 13, 2011 order regarding the payment of the filing fee for 
this appeal is denied, for his claim that he should not have to pay the fee lacks merit.  See 
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (“[I]f a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma 
pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.”).  
